In September, 2007, the IPCC convened a workshop to discuss how a new set of scenarios to support climate model runs, mitigation analyses, and impact, adaptation and vulnerability research might be developed. The first phase of the suggested new approach is now approaching completion. This article discusses some of the issues raised by scenario relevant research and analysis since the last set of IPCC scenarios were created (IPCC SRES, 2000) that will need to be addressed as new scenarios are developed by the research community during the second phase. These include (1) providing a logic for how societies manage to transition from historical paths to the various future development paths foreseen in the scenarios, (2) long-term economic growth issues, (3) the appropriate GDP metric to use (purchasing power parity or market exchange rates), (4) ongoing issues with moving from the broad geographic and time scales of the emission scenarios to the finer scales needed for impacts, adaptation and vulnerability analyses and (5) some possible ways to handle the urgent request from the policy community for some guidance on scenario likelihoods. The challenges involved in addressing these issues are manifold; the reward is greater credibility and deeper understanding of an analytic tool that does much to form the context within which many issues in addition to the climate problem will need to be addressed.
The IPCC has recently decided to rely on the integrated assessment community to create the new scenarios for the fifth IPCC assessment rather than conduct its own scenario development process. In preparation for this decision, a workshop was held to discuss how a new set of scenarios to support climate model simulations to serve as a basis for: mitigation analyses; and impacts, adaptation and vulnerability research. An extensive report documents the results of the workshop and subsequent discussion and review (IPCC 2008) . The initial step was the choice of four representative concentration pathways (RCP) from the existing scenario literature and the subsequent extension of the selected pathways to provide the full set of data needed by the Earth system models. The next stage of the process, occurring in parallel with the climate model simulation of the RCP's, will be the development of new socio-economic and emission scenarios.
The current IPCC scenarios attracted significant attention on the rates of economic growth, on the need to provide a greater level of geographic detail and on the lack of any statement about scenario likelihoods (Nakicenovic et al 2000 , Castles and Henderson 2003 , Schneider 2001 . This essay focuses on the how analysis and research since the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) bears on how developers of new scenarios could more effectively address the issues raised since the SRES was published. The essay is not a full or complete review of the issues: it focuses on some areas where further attention could improve the quality of analysis with relatively little effort. It does not for example address the complex issues emerging from the active work on land use as part of the RCP work, nor does it focus much on the demands arising from the meeting in December, 2009 in Copenhagen, where the successor to the Kyoto treaty is to be negotiated.
Abstracting from the short run issues which seem to arise immediately upon the completion of an IPCC assessment (the USSR collapse, the explosive growth of China and Japan, or the current major economic downturn), there are areas where a new set of scenarios could improve on the SRES scenario process: (1) provide a logic for how societies transition from historical paths to the various future development paths foreseen in the scenarios; (2) decompose growth in GDP into growth in labor force and growth in labor productivity; (3) address the complex issue of how to measure economic activity levels across space and time with more care (this goes beyond the simple choice of whether to use purchasing power parity or market exchange rates); (4) downscaling; and (5) scenario likelihood.
Transitions
In the guise of a discussion about how GDP was measured, a great deal of discussion was focused on the growth rates of GDP across countries and time (Castles and Henderson 2003, Grübler et al 2004) . The dominant sense of the critics was that growth rates were too high, leading to an overstatement of greenhouse gas emissions. The issue the SRES growth rates was addressed in AR4, WGIII, in chapter three, with the conclusion that for Latin America, Africa and the Mideast, the two high growth scenarios, known as A1 and B1 had growth rates for these regions which were above those found in the literature (IPCC 2007) , while the growth rates of the three regions were in the middle of the range of recent scenarios for A2 and B2. The transition issue, however, goes beyond the problem of numbers to the issue of the storyline that explains what is anticipated to happen to cause the future to diverge from the pattern of the past. So far there has been little discussion of how one might go about better grounding a new set of economic growth scenarios, and in particular provide a plausible path leading from historical experience to alternative growth paths in the near term (Parson et al 2007) . This issue assumes more importance as the discussion of assumption of responsibility for mitigation moves from the academic to the real world of negotiation and action.
Consider a troubling example of a transition from the SRES, that of Brazil. As shown in figure 1, Brazil's historical pattern of output per member of the labor force has been static or declining. Yet the pattern of growth implicit in the MiniCAM, one of the six models which participated in the SRES, results for the A1 family of scenarios is for strong growth in output per worker beginning in 1990, in clear contradiction to the historical pattern. What set of policies or other developments could explain a rapid change from a static output per worker to the rapid growth foreseen in the A1 and B1 scenario families? In the SRES, this change was motivated by an element in the charge to the working group to consider scenarios where there was convergence in per capita income levels, but how this was to be accomplished was not considered. Developing a transition strategy is not unique to Brazil; it extends to all of South America and Africa.
China and India, on the other hand, have grown more rapidly than was contemplated in the SRES. This has raised per capita energy use and led to more carbon intensive energy supplies, thus pushing current emissions higher, leading to a concern that the path of emissions will be permanently higher than any of the SRES scenarios. Whether this will turn out to be the case depends on the future paths for per capita energy consumption (which does tend to saturate at higher income levels) and the carbon intensity of energy supply, which may or may not reverse its current upward trend.
An additional major transition issue is urbanization, with almost all of the expected 2 billion population increase by 2030 expected to occur in the urban areas in currently developing countries. Moreover, approximately half of the increase is estimated to be in urban slums, approximately doubling the size of the slum population to 2 billion (UN- Habitat 2006) . The size and rapid growth of a population living without adequate infrastructure, education, and public health access, and the limited governing ability of many regions in the developing world, is likely to limit the ability of the less well-off regions of the world to focus on global issues such as climate.
Another, perhaps less obvious population issue, with the transition in developed economies is the slowdown in labor force growth, leading to a significant slowdown in the rate of economic growth for most countries in the developed parts of the world. This is elaborated below in the section on long-term drivers.
There is no pretense here these transition issues are an easy problem or one admitting of a unique solution. It is however, essential not to recreate the kind of problems that the SRES has with the transition from historical to projected economic activity paths for Latin America, Africa and the Mid-East. Avoiding the SRES issues with the transition is going to require a much more detailed, resource intensive process than was feasible for the SRES team, encompassing a longer period with ample chance for review at a regional level before finalizing trajectories. The differing nature of the economic concerns and the close connection of the near-term path to current economic conditions suggests that a different set of models and developers is needed to perform the analysis and develop the estimates required to support decisions about such questions as near-term targets. The models used to develop the SRES emissions trajectories do not have the capacity to incorporate in an analytically useful way such events as the current worldwide economic malaise, yet concerns about this slowdown will surely come to the negotiating table Copenhagen. Whether the right strategy is to develop a new group or extend the current community of scenario developers is an important question. What does seem essential is to extend the set of models and expertise. This would allow the integrated assessment models to do what they do well, which is thinking about the longterm drivers for emissions and how these will evolve over time, while letting those with real expertise on short-term economic developments focus on the transition issues. There will have to be some good dialog about the issues and that dialog is certain to produce new and deeper understanding of the issues.
The long-term drivers of economic activity
Economists use a simple paradigm to think about long-term trends in output: it is that GDP = number of workers x output per worker. Past the transition period, these drivers for longterm economic growth, formally called labor force and labor productivity will need more careful consideration than they received in the SRES. This is particularly true because of the issue raised earlier, trend breaks in the growth of the labor force due to declining fertility and ageing. While the SRES provided a qualitative discussion of the issues of ageing and fertility, the demographic scenarios used in the SRES contained only aggregate population levels. In preparing MiniCAM runs for inclusion in the SRES, it was necessary to create an independent estimate of the age structure of the population so that the working age population inputs required by the MiniCAM could be generated. The MiniCAM was the only one of the six models used by the SRES to consider even this limited additional demographic dynamic and even here, labor force participation rates were considered to be uniform across all age groups within the labor force.
Extrapolations of long-term trends in total economic activity will almost certainly overstate future growth in aggregate activity as labor force growth declines and even turns negative in many regions. Historically, growth in the labor force has been roughly as important as growth in labor productivity in determining the growth of total GDP.
Likely demographic changes will reduce if not eliminate growth in labor as a driver of increased economic activity for many regions. Labor force results from two factors, the age structure of the population and the labor force participation rate for specific age groups. As figure 2, showing population by age group for the 1990 OECD, indicates, the age structure of the OECD is very dynamic, achieving stability in age structure only in 2080. Even if labor force participation rates for the older age groups were to reverse their current declining trends, the growth in labor, which has contributed about forty per cent of Europe's overall growth in GDP, will end, and under the population assumptions behind the chart, would decline and eventually turn negative, reducing the overall level of economic growth to about one half per cent a year, down from its historical average of around 2.5%. In practical terms, this means that the size of the European economy, now roughly equivalent to that of the United States, would decline to about 2/3 the size of the US economy by 2100, which, in contrast to all other regions in the MiniCAM model, has a relatively constant age structure.
The only exception to the stable age structure in the United States is the oldest age group, those over 75. And the growth in this age group may well be an underestimate, as life expectancy only reaches 85. Extrapolation of current rates of change in life expectancy (roughly linear at 2 yrs per year over the last half century) would push life expectancy to or perhaps a bit past 100 for currently developed countries. For developing countries, the ageing of the population is apt to be much more dynamic, depending in significant ways on the development path. As figure 3 shows, increase in life expectancy in India could be sharply different, depending on both the rate and nature of improvements in public health, water, and education . Figure 3 underlines the need for a consistent set of demographic and socio-economic futures and the model extensions that may be necessary to support them. Although these areas are still being actively researched, we do know that education, adequate water infrastructure and good public health measures affect both birth rates and mortality, so extending the basic models to include these factors will be essential .
The second major determinant of output, labor productivity, can be very volatile in the short run and can also, as both China and India demonstrate, increase substantially in the presence of favorable economic policies, assuming that other necessary factors, such as a sufficiently well-educated labor force are also present. However, the current high rates of growth in labor productivity in both China and India will eventually slow down. As the transition from very low-productivity, subsistence-level agricultural activity to modern economic activity proceeds in China and India, the proportional increment of each transition will become lower, so we can anticipate that the current high levels of growth in labor productivity will decline. How fast such a decline occurs, and whether there will periods of disruption when the components of economic activity become out of balance, remains the appropriate realm of a scenario, rather than the province of a purely model based approach. What is clear is that in the long run, labor productivity growth rates in the developing world will be determined by the sector-level growth of productivity, just as they are in the developed world. Determinants of sector-level productivity growth have been the focus of an extensive literature, which has recently been extended to include intangible capital (Corrado et al 2006) . (Intangible capital is the value of systems, knowhow, good will, and other aspects of economic that are not realized as physical entities but contribute to the ability to produce goods and services.) The value of such intangible assets as associated with current energy systems will be significantly reduced as the impact of significant policies to manage carbon flows to the environment will necessarily require major changes in energy systems. These systems are now of enormous scale and high reliability in developed countries. Acquiring systems of this scale and reliability has to be a hallmark of reaching developed status for those countries not so blessed today. The skills and knowledge as well as the regulatory systems and market structures necessary to create the current system have considerable economic value. This intangible capital, these skills, knowledge, systems and structure will experience rapid depreciation as carbon management policies come into play or as expectations of such policies come to dominate thinking. The value implicit in these skills and organizational capacities is not well documented, nor is the potential impact of the loss even considered-much less understood-in current assessments of future economic activity levels.
The current interest in hybrid vehicles (Reed 2008 ) and nuclear power, and the explosive growth of companies investing in alternative fuels and solar power is testimony to a change in expectations. But such interest and growth do not necessarily indicate that the necessary changes can occur with the speed and reliability that appear very likely to be required. Failure to rapidly replace existing systems and know-how can be expected to have a significant negative impact on economic growth rates due to the crucial role of energy in production.
Measuring economic activity
An ongoing issue, raised to prominence by critics of the SRES (Castles and Henderson 2003, Parson et al 2007) , is how to measure economic activity. As discussions of which countries assume responsibility when continue, this issue is only going to become more difficult. Two of the many problems plaguing the measurement of economic activity are important to the scenario process. The first is how to appropriately value economic output across countries. If the world were a less dynamic place, perhaps it would be possible to use current exchange rates for this process, but, since it is not, and exchange rates vary considerably, they do not provide a very reliable source of long-term assessments of economic activity. (For example, the dollar in 2008 buys half the number of Euros it did in 2002.) When it comes to making judgments about relative standards of living, the issue is still more complex, as the cost of domestic goods relative to traded goods can be quite different across countries. When incomes are expressed in purchasing power parity terms, restatements of income in developing countries can change by as much as a factor of four. Unfortunately, this too is a dynamic factor as is testified to by the most recent release of purchasing power parity estimates of national income, which saw a reduction relative to the previous release of 40% in PPP incomes for both China and India (World Bank 2008) . One underappreciated problem is that published data on purchasing power parity based measures reflect the set of prices used to determine purchasing power at one point in time. PPP measures are then extended based on real local growth rates. It is however the case that as countries become better off, their relative prices change in a way that reduces purchasing power parity relative to market based measures of income. Minicam, like other models used in the SRES, corrects for this by extrapolating the present day cross section relationship between purchasing power parity and output per worker into the future, but there is no analytic support beyond common sense for this procedure. As noted in the working group III report of AR4, (IPCC 2007) using either market based GDP or PPP based GDP leads to similar estimates of emissions when the cross walk is done correctly. This result is straight forward as both sets of numbers use the same real local growth rates in income. Analysis of the relationship which reflected the changing relative prices does not appear to be available today, suggesting that any long-term scenario which uses income to mediate changes in physical activity such as emissions is going to be seen as being somewhat arbitrary. One possible approach to the problem is to develop measures of well-being which are independent of income levels. It should be possible to develop physical measures of housing, health, communications, transportation, etc, and then develop benchmarks for differing levels of well-being. This is also a useful way to approach the issue of long-term energy consumption patterns. Examination of historical data suggests that there is a period during which energy use grows at about the same rate as income does (e.g., South Korea since 1970) but then, as countries become well off, the growth in energy use relative to income slows by about an order of magnitude (the United States since the first oil shock). What is important to understand here is what changes underlie this rather dramatic change in apparent income elasticity. Is it a saturation of various uses that drives the change? Is it large changes in efficiency as fuel mix changes? Is it the movement on energy intensive production to developing economies? This approach allows one to at least partially escape the presently unresolved issue of what is the appropriate long-term income elasticity of demand for energy. By grounding the changes in income elasticity in these physical phenomena, one can then compute the implied point at which income elasticity should decline. It also extends a development which has become a critical part of most energy models, a parallel system of physical and value measures within the same modeling framework.
Downscaling
A different scale problem presents those who would use the results of a new scenario exercise to support work on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation-that of going from scale of the integrated assessment models used to develop the emission scenarios and the climate models used to realize the climate implications of the emissions to the geographic, administrative and time scales appropriate to their analysis. It may be regions to countries, or totals to components, or grid to sub-grid scales, but downscaling of some form is essential to provide the kind of information that is needed for these forms of analysis. Downscaling can viewed as a method for extrapolating from the available model results to the scale the problem requires. Extrapolation is risky-it requires careful checks for consistency and for obvious errors. To the extent possible, extrapolation should rely on process or structural models rather than simple arithmetic rules. Even here there is a risk that the extrapolation process will reveal issues with the original model structure or realization. Downscaling is a compromise, born of limited resources and understanding, and if approached with care and a sense of the limits of the possible, can be the basis for a better understanding of the future implications of current human activities.
Socio-economic downscaling has received considerable attention in recent years (Arnell et al 2004 , Grübler et al 2007 , van Vuuren et al 2007 , but remains troublesome. We illustrate the issues which can arise even when the downscaling is done with care. The MiniCAM model uses an estimate of labor force as a driver for economic activity and in preparation for the Climate Change Science Program scenario study (Clarke et al 2008) , a decision was made to use the total population data from the Techno-Garden population scenario (O'Neill 2005) . The MiniCAM uses separate participation rates by gender and for ages 15-24, 25-54, 55-64, 65-74 , and assumes no work for those 75 and older. To estimate the population age structure initial assumptions about the path of total completed fertility and the evolution of age specific death rates was input into a computer program which adjusted the age specific death rates and fertility to achieve a match with the Techno-Garden population total. Figure 4 shows the results for the Minicam region Australia and New Zealand. The figure shows a rather abrupt break in the pattern of changes in life expectancy, moving from a fairly steady increase up to 2050 to a historically unprecedented decline and increased variability post 2050. The break in 2050 appears to be an artifact due to a UN assumption of an end to immigration (O'Neill 2008) . The variability arises from the changes needed to make the country components match the regional totals of the IIASA runs which were the basis of the Techno-Garden population scenarios (O'Neill 2008) , while the decline in life expectancy suggests that there is an inherent incompatibility between the fertility assumption and the population total assumption post 2050.
The example illustrates the type of problems that can emerge from a two stage process, where the analytic requirements of the second stage problem require more detailed information than was considered in developing the first stage estimates. The eventual solution for the MiniCAM will be to develop a country level age-cohort based demographics tool. This of course just pushes the problem down a level, leaving issues of population in coastal areas, for example, potentially subject to a similar set of problems. It remains to be determined if it is possible to downscale population and GDP below the level at which the analysis was conducted without encountering trend breaks or other problems which raise credibility issues. Further attention to the issue is a high priority.
Scenario likelihoods
A final issue arises from a desire to use the scenarios as a basis for risk management, the appropriate decision making paradigm given the extent of the uncertainty inherent in many aspects of the 'climate' problem. There has been a substantial discussion in the literature about the need to assign probability to SRES scenarios so that risk management decision strategies can be applied. (Schneider 2001, Grübler and Nakicenovic 2001) . What seems like a relatively straightforward and simple request is actually quite a complex problem. First, it is necessary to be clear what decision one is trying to inform. So, if one puts the question as to what might happen to emissions in the long run in the absence of significant new policy actions, one finds on examination of the SRES six scenarios that only two fulfil this condition, A2 and B2. All of the A1 scenarios assume aggressive action on economic development, assuming in effect that all developing regions manage to duplicate the most successful historically observed growth in output, while B1 assumes a world of aggressive policies focused on sustainability. Of the two remaining scenarios, A2 has an improbable population scenario, made so by more rapid than anticipated declines in fertility. Does B2 then deserve to have a likelihood of 1? The answer is obvious: it does not! The SRES scenarios, by the nature of the way in which they are constructed, are conditional cases, not suited for illuminating the relative likelihoods of cases pertaining to specific questions. The same will be true of the reference concentration pathways (IPCC 2008) scenarios, selected to represent one base case and three different stabilization levels (n.b. each stabilization case is derived from a different base case).
So suppose a modeler did want to create some scenarios that would shed light on a particular question. How could he or she go about doing this? One method that appears not to work is to present alternative scenarios and ask respondents which they think is more likely. Derived from conjoint choice analysis, this approach has two problems: (1) the estimation process requires a sample space, which turns out to be incomplete and infinite, and (2) people turn out to have very similar opinions about many of the scenarios, leading to an estimated zero relative probability for several of the SRES scenarios. Alternative approaches have more promise. One recent paper developed a conditional approach to estimating the population likelihoods by selecting sets of scenarios deemed to be consistent with the SRES story lines out of a large set of scenarios constructed to be equally likely (O'Neill 2004) . By comparing the number of scenarios consistent with different story lines, it is possible to infer the relative likelihood of the different story lines. A similar but more extensive analysis performs Monte Carlo analysis of the main drivers of greenhouse gas emissions where the parameters of the distributions are conditional on the SRES story lines (van Vuuren et al 2008) .
A similar approach would be to approach the problem by examining the likelihood of the major drivers of outcomes of interest. Suppose, to be concrete, the question of interest was the range of emissions in 2100 under a no-further-climatepolicy regime (the putative mandate for the SRES scenarios). One can express total carbon emissions from energy use as the product of population x energy use per capita x carbon per unit of energy. Using a focus group approach or other form of elicitation, one could then develop a few cases for population, for energy use per capita and for the carbon intensity of energy. As an example, consider the values for the six SRES scenarios, Population of 7.1, 7.1, 7.1, 7.1, 10.4, and 15.1 billion, energy use of 64.9, 91.3, 95, 180, 220.3, and 246 .7 gigajoules per capita and carbon intensity levels of 3. 4, 7.5, 11.4, 14.5, 19.3, and 20 .2 teragrams per exajoule. Treating all possible combinations of these three variables as equally likely yields the cumulative distribution of emissions in 2100 seen in figure 5 (the 'unweighted' line). If one then assigns probabilities to the population values and conditional probabilities to energy use given population and then to energy intensity given population and energy use, then a weighted distribution emerges. Figure 5 shows one possible outcome from such an exercise as the 'weighted' line. The weights range from 0.0003 to 0.0420 as compared to the unweighted value of 0.004 63. The point of the exercise is not to derive precise values but to get a sense of how different sets of outcomes and different weighting schemes affect the overall distribution of the cases. From examining combinations of inputs lead to high and low cases, the analyst can derive a good sense of what kinds of futures would lead to these outcomes. Finally, by using this as a basis for selecting cases for more intensive investigation, one has the information needed to determine where an intensive case fits in the overall set of cases. Note, however, that the likelihoods or weights can be derived only by constraining the values of the drivers to a small set, so it would be inappropriate to assume that these likelihoods represent the full set of future outcomes. One is still faced with the necessity of making judgments about the future risks, rather than being able to rely on an 'objective' set of risks.
Discussion
This essay has touched on only some of the issues which analysis and research since the publication of the SRES report suggest require attention in the development of a new set of socio-economic scenarios to support analysis of climate change mitigation, impacts, vulnerability and adaptation. Some of the additional areas needing deeper attention include energy use, energy supply, and the interaction of mitigation strategies with climate change itself (e.g., consider the role of large-scale land use associated a mitigation strategy heavily based on biomass). While a substantial amount of data collection, model development and analysis is required, doing this work and building on the lessons from the SRES can be expected to substantially deepen and improve the understanding necessary to develop the effective policies required to manage the interface between human and natural systems in what history may well come to regard as the century in which the conflict between these two systems was most intense.
